William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice
Volume 27 (2020-2021)
Issue 1 Justice Across Borders: Social Justice
and Its Intersections with Law, Immigration, and
Human Rights

Article 8

November 2020

Amplifying Voices and Fighting Impunity: A Case for Incorporating
Victim Impact into Early Release Decisions at the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
Yasmine Palmer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Repository Citation
Yasmine Palmer, Amplifying Voices and Fighting Impunity: A Case for Incorporating Victim
Impact into Early Release Decisions at the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals, 27 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 233 (2020), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/
vol27/iss1/8
Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl

AMPLIFYING VOICES AND FIGHTING IMPUNITY: A CASE
FOR INCORPORATING VICTIM IMPACT INTO EARLY
RELEASE DECISIONS AT THE INTERNATIONAL RESIDUAL
MECHANISM FOR CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

INTRODUCTION
I. THE CONFLICTS AND THE COURTS: BACKGROUND ON THE ICTY,
THE ICTR AND THE MECHANISM
A. The Yugoslav Wars and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
1. The ICTY
B. The Rwandan Genocide and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
1. The ICTR
C. The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals
II. CURRENT EARLY RELEASE PROCEDURES AT THE MECHANISM
A. Statutory Procedure
B. The Two-Thirds Rule: Presumption-Turned-Quasi-Rule
C. Criticism of the Two-Thirds Rule
III. VICTIM IMPACT AT THE MECHANISM
IV. MODIFYING EARLY RELEASE PROCEDURES AT THE MECHANISM
A. Why Victims Need to Be Included in the Process
B. Step 1: Amend Rule 151 of the Mechanism’s Rules of
Evidence and Procedure
C. Step 2: Modify the Mechanism’s Existing Practice
Direction on Early Release
V. VICTIM IMPACT AT SIMILARLY STRUCTURED BODIES: THE
(RESIDUAL) SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
A. The Sierra Leonean Civil War and President Kabbah’s
Special Court
B. Procedural Similarities Between the Mechanism and the
RSCSL
C. Consideration of Victim Impact as a Statutory
Requirement
D. The Rules in Practice
CONCLUSION

233

234

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 27:233

INTRODUCTION
On April 11, 1994, thousands of Rwandan Tutsis fled from the
violent fighting in their hometowns to Gikongoro Diocese.1 There,
local authorities directed them to the Murambi Technical School,
promising to provide additional protection to those who stayed there.2
Less than a week later, members of the Interahamwe civilian militia
launched two separate attacks on the school.3 Armed only with traditional weapons, the Interahamwe’s murderous attempts were unsuccessful and the Tutsis suffered little to no casualties.4 Then, Aloys
Simba arrived.5
On April 21, Simba, a former Lieutenant Colonel of the Rwandan
armed forces, pulled up to the Murambi Technical School in a pickup
truck “loaded with machetes.”6 He distributed the weapons to the
large group of Interahamwe members who had attacked the school in
the days prior, urging them to “get rid of the filth.”7 With Simba’s machetes in hand, the Interahamwe launched their third and final attack
on the Murambi Technical School.8 By the end of the Interahamwe’s
twelve-hour assault, thousands of Tutsis had been slaughtered.9
The Murambi Technical School massacre is only one of the many
criminal incidents that Aloys Simba was accused of participating in
during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.10 Eight years after the attack, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) indicted Simba
for a series of crimes.11 Trial Chamber I of the ICTR ultimately found
him guilty of genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity.12 The Trial Chamber sentenced Simba to twenty-five years in
prison, despite the Prosecution’s submission that life imprisonment
was the adequate sentence.13 Two years later, the Appeals Chamber
1. Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-I, Indictment, ¶ 22 (May 3, 2002) [hereinafter Simba Indictment]; Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgement and
Sentence, ¶ 87 (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Simba Judgement and Sentence].
2. Simba Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, ¶ 116.
3. Id. ¶¶ 89–90, 116; see also The Organization, Leave None to Tell the Story:
Genocide in Rwanda, HUM. RTS. WATCH (March 1999), https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999
/rwanda/Geno4-7-03.htm#P714_191614 [https://perma.cc/RG3T-FYFS] (explaining the
role of the Interahamwe in the conflict).
4. Simba Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, ¶¶ 89–90.
5. Id. ¶ 87.
6. Id.
7. Id. ¶¶ 92, 418.
8. Id. ¶¶ 92, 116.
9. Id. ¶¶ 116, 416.
10. Simba Indictment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 30–35.
11. Id. ¶ I.
12. Simba Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, ¶ 427.
13. Id. ¶¶ 430, 445.
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of the ICTR denied Simba’s appeal of the judgement in its entirety
and affirmed his sentence.14 Those who had suffered great losses as
a result of Aloys Simba’s actions could take comfort in knowing he
would be locked away for the next two decades. Or so they thought.
In 2018, Simba submitted an application for early release to the
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, the
judicial body tasked with continuing the work of the ICTR following
its closure.15 The request was met with widespread anger from the
citizens of Rwanda.16 The Rwandan government submitted a formal
response to the Mechanism, opposing Simba’s release “in the strongest terms” and asserting that releasing the convicted war criminal
early “would cause ‘untold psychological harm’ to the survivors and
victims” of his crimes.17 In its statement, the government also requested a victim impact hearing, during which victim statements
could be heard and considered by the presiding judge.18
In his decision regarding Simba’s application, Judge Theodor
Meron responded to the Rwandan public’s concerns.19 He stated that
he would “take note” of the victim statements attached to the
Rwandan Statement, but emphasized that the discretionary power
that he held as President of the Mechanism did not provide a “sufficiently compelling reason to allow victims to make submissions . . .
or to compel [him] to consider them” in his decision.20 Simba’s request
for early release was ultimately approved by Judge Meron in January
2019 and he was subsequently released.21
During the twenty-four years that the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were
open, more than 250 individuals were indicted for genocide, crimes
14. Simba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, [Appeal] Judgement, 103 (Nov. 27,
2007).
15. Jennifer Trahan, Unpacking the request for early release by three Rwanda
genocide prisoners, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 22, 2018), https://theconversation.com/un
packing-the-request-for-early-release-by-three-rwanda-genocide-prisoners-101743
[https://perma.cc/CWQ6-VF4X]; see infra notes 92–100 and accompanying text explaining
the functioning of the Mechanism.
16. Trahan, supra note 15. An example: Damas Dukundane, who lost his entire family
during the Kaduha Parish massacre, another attack enabled by Simba, was quoted as
saying that “if we are going for justice, Simba cannot be let out” of prison. Jina Moore,
Betraying Justice for Rwanda’s Genocide Survivors, THE NEW YORKER (July 9, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/betraying-justice-for-rwandas-genocide-sur
vivors [https://perma.cc/FY5G-NQV3].
17. Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. MICT-14-62-ES.1, Public Redacted Version of the
President’s 7 Jan. 2019 Decision on the Early Release of Aloys Simba, ¶ 67 (Jan. 7, 2019)
[hereinafter Simba Early Release Decision] (quoting Rwanda Statement).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 82.
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against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war.22
One hundred and fifty-two of those indicted went on to be convicted
and sentenced.23 By July 2019, eighty of these war criminals and
genocidaires24 had been released, eighty-five percent of which were
released prior to completing their full sentences.25 All of such releases were conducted without any mandated consideration of victim impact.26
This Note argues that the procedural rules of the Mechanism
should be modified to include victim impact as one of the factors
that must be considered during the review of early release applications. International criminal tribunals do not have clients.27 They
seek justice on behalf of the greater global community.28 However,
it is the suffering of victims of international crimes that serves as the
basis of the work that they do.29 As Part I details, the people who lived
through the Rwandan Genocide and the Yugoslav wars were subjected to crimes ranging from forced deportation and destruction of
property to sexual violence and genocide.30 Countless victims and
witnesses relived their trauma, either remotely or from inside the
courtroom, to bolster the prosecutorial efforts of the ICTY, the ICTR,
and the Mechanism.31 If the Mechanism seeks to continue to apply
22. Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, LEGACY WEBSITE OF THE INT’L CRIM. TRIFORMER YUGOSLAVIA, https://www.icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty
-facts-figures [https://perma.cc/CYB3-RJ4T]; The ICTR in Brief, LEGACY WEBSITE OF THE
INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal [https://perma.cc
/5VB2-Q3X6].
23. Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, supra note 22; The ICTR in Brief, supra note
22.
24. “Qui prend part à un génocide.” (Someone who takes part in a genocide) Définitions: Génocidaire, LAROUSSE, https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/g%C3%A9
nocidaire/36587 [https://perma.cc/TGA9-LFWB].
25. Barbora Hola, Early Release of ICTR Convicts: The Practice Beyond the Outrage,
JUSTICEINFO.NET (July 5, 2019), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/ictr/41861
-early-release-of-ICTR-convicts-the-practice-beyond-the-outrage.html [https://perma.cc
/6J5Q-FASD].
26. See id.
27. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, 7 (May 25, 1993) (stating the purpose of the ICTY and how
the Tribunal does not prohibit individual victims from filing suit and seeking their own
damages).
28. Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction, LEGACY WEBSITE OF THE INT’L
CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, https://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal
/mandate-and-crimes-under-ICTY-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/AG4D-4T72].
29. See The Tribunal—Establishment, LEGACY WEBSITE OF THE INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, https://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/establishment
[https://perma.cc/VG4G-RRWU].
30. Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction, supra note 28.
31. Witnesses, LEGACY WEBSITE OF THE INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, https://www.icty.org/en/about/registry/witnesses [https://perma.cc/TL9X
-TY7M].
BUNAL FOR THE
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its two-thirds threshold ‘rule’32 and release Convicted Persons33 early,
the concerns of victims and witnesses must be brought to the decisionmaking table.
This Note fills an important gap in existing literature on international criminal law. Little has been written on the topic of early
release and the literature that does exist primarily focuses on the
judicial morality or efficacy of the practice as a whole.34 I argue that
including victim impact as a key component of early release application reviews conducted by the President of the Mechanism is a
necessary step towards fighting impunity amongst perpetrators of
international crimes.35
Parts II and III explain the current process for reviewing early
release applications, including an overview of the two-thirds sentencing threshold and the role that victim impact currently plays in
the proceedings. In Part IV, this Note provides a two-step recommendation for how the Mechanism can modify its current framework
to account for the concerns of victims and witnesses. Part V discusses
the procedural blueprint provided by the Residual Special Court for
Sierra Leone, positioning it as an example that the Mechanism might
benefit from following.
I. THE CONFLICTS AND THE COURTS: BACKGROUND ON
THE ICTY, THE ICTR AND THE MECHANISM
Appreciating the importance of including victim impact in early
release determinations requires an understanding of the gravity of the
crimes that the Mechanism charges and convicts individuals for committing. To do that, background on the conflicts that prompted the
creation of the Mechanism’s predecessors—the ICTY and ICTR—is
necessary.
A. The Yugoslav Wars and the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
When the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was formed,
the varying ethnic and religious groups of eight republics and
32. See infra notes 108–16 and the accompanying text.
33. “Convicted Person” refers to individuals convicted of any crime by the ICTR, the
ICTY or the Mechanism.
34. See Jonathan H. Choi, Early Release in International Criminal Law, 123 YALE
L. J. 1784, 1789 (2014); see also Andrew Merrylees, Two-Thirds and You’re Out? The
Practice of Early Release at the ICTY and ICC, in Light of the Goals of International
Criminal Justice, 8 AMSTERDAM L.F. 69, 70 (2016). But see Jessica M. Kelder, Barbora
Holá, & Joris van Wijk, Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International
Crimes: A Case Study of the ICTY and ICTR, 14 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1177, 1177 (2014).
35. See infra notes 152–53 and the accompanying text on the meaning of “impunity.”
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provinces were blended together.36 Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia’s first
Prime Minister and the only person to ever serve as its President,
quashed any and all whisperings of anti-Yugoslavian nationalism.37
However, following Tito’s death in 1980, tensions between traditionally Christian and Muslim ethnic groups began to flare and nationalist
ideologies spread throughout the different republics and provinces.38
By the early 1990s, the central government had weakened and republics began to seek independence from the federation.39 Yugoslavia
reached a period of intense political crisis.40 It was against this backdrop that the Yugoslav Wars took place.
The fighting began in 1991 when the Yugoslav government, led
by Serbia’s President Slobodan Miloševiþ, sent the Yugoslav People’s
Army (JNA)41 to circumvent Croatia’s campaign for independence.42
Joining forces with the ethnic Serb minority of Croatia, the JNA
took control of nearly one-third of Croatia’s territory, shelled areas
like the city of Dubrovnik, and sent thousands of Croats and other
non-Serbs into exile.43 Though Croatia suffered great losses during
this conflict, the deadliest period of the Yugoslav Wars took place in
36. The six republics were Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The two provinces were Kosovo and Vojvodina. The Former
Yugoslavia: The Conflicts, LEGACY WEBSITE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, https://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia/con
flicts [https://perma.cc/93DL-DG2G].
37. Borgna Brunner & David Johnson, Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia, From World
War I to the Splintering of the Country, INFOPLEASE, https://www.infoplease.com /history
/world/timeline-the-former-yugoslavia [https://perma.cc/C2NM-RPLP].
38. Id.; The Former Yugoslavia: The Conflicts, supra note 36.
39. Brunner & Johnson, supra note 37.
40. The Former Yugoslavia: The Conflicts, supra note 36.
41. “Yugoslav People’s Army” translates to Jugoslavenska narodna armija in Croatian
and Jugoslovenska narodna armija in Serbian. The ICTY and the Mechanism refer to
the militia in judicial documents by its acronym or the English translation of its name.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martiþ, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, at 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For Yugoslavia June 12, 2007).
42. The JNA was also sent into the republic of Slovenia, which declared independence
on the same day as Croatia. The fighting between Slovenian forces and the JNA lasted
for ten days—hence the reference to the conflict as the “Ten-Day War”—and the JNA
ultimately withdrew. The Former Yugoslavia: The Conflicts, supra note 36; see also Amy
Burchfield, International Criminal Courts for the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra
Leone: A Guide to online and Print Resources, GLOBALEX (Oct. 2005), https://www.nyu
lawglobal.org/globalex/International_Criminal_Courts.html [https://perma.cc/4G2Q-4PN9].
43. The bloody conflict in Croatia occurred over the course of four years (1991–1995)
and resulted in the death or displacement of thousands of Croatians. The above sentences do not describe the conflict in full. For more detailed information on the Croatian
struggle for independence, see Croatia Profile—Timeline, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17217954 [https://perma.cc/7DRP-GGR6];
Balkans Special Report: Croatia Overview, WASH. POST (1997), https://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/overview/croatia.htm [https://perma.cc/UN5Z
-3X4P]; Serbo-Croatian War/Homeland War, GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.global
security.org/military/world/war/croatia-1.htm [https://perma.cc/V23V-JGQY].
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, triggered, yet again, by a referendum that saw
a majority of Bosnian citizens vote for independence.44 The Bosnian
Serb minority rebelled and went on to assert control over more than
sixty percent of the country, with the support of JNA units from
Croatia.45 In a bid to create and maintain an ethnically pure Serbian
state, Serb forces led a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Bosnian
Muslims that resulted in the death of an estimated 100,000 people.46
More than 2,000,000 people were forced to flee their homes.47 Detention centers where thousands of men were subjected to poor living conditions and torture were set up around the country.48 At least 20,000
women and girls were systematically raped by soldiers.49 Individual
cities were targeted by indiscriminate shelling and shooting attacks,
the most deadly of which was the infamous eleven-day Srebrenica
massacre of 1995, during which over 8,000 men and boys were killed.50
1. The ICTY
The atrocities committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere
in what is now the former Yugoslavia pushed the international community into action.51 The International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the United Nations
Security Council in May 1993.52 The ICTY was the first war crimes
tribunal that the world had seen since the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals created after World War II.53 It was the first ever court to
have jurisdiction over the crime of genocide.54 The objective of the
Tribunal was to prosecute the individuals “responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.”55
Hearing cases on crimes committed from 1991 onwards, the
ICTY indicted 161 individuals, including three of the most notorious
44. The Former Yugoslavia: The Conflicts, supra note 36.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also Burchfield, supra note 42.
47. The Former Yugoslavia: The Conflicts, supra note 36.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Angela Robson, Weapon of War, NEW INTERNATIONALIST (June 5,
1993), https://newint.org/features/1993/06/05/rape [https://perma.cc/7VA2-26LY].
50. The Former Yugoslavia: The Conflicts, supra note 36.
51. See S.C. Res. 827, 1 (May 25, 1993).
52. The Former Yugoslavia: The Conflicts, supra note 36.
53. International Criminal Justice Since Nuremberg, UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/simon-skjodt-center
/work/ferencz-international-justice-initiative/transitional-justice/international-criminal
-justice-since-nuremberg [https://perma.cc/DA8R-4WUQ].
54. Id.
55. Statute of the International Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., art. 1, U.N. Doc.
at 5 (1993).
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figures at the forefront of the conflict: President Slobodan Miloševiþ,
Bosnian General Ratko Mladiþ, and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadžiþ.56 Ninety individuals were convicted of crimes ranging from
forcible displacement and deportation to genocide and murder as a
crime against humanity.57 Thirteen were referred to national courts
and nineteen were acquitted of their charges.58 After twenty-four years
of groundbreaking work in the field of international criminal law, the
ICTY closed on December 31, 2017.59 The establishment of the ICTY
laid the groundwork for the creation of other international tribunals,
like that which was established in the face of the Rwandan Genocide.60
B. The Rwandan Genocide and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
Though the Rwandan Genocide occurred in 1994, ethnic tensions began building between Rwanda’s two largest ethnic groups,
the Hutus and the Tutsis, decades before.61 Prior to the colonialist
era, the Tutsis had generally held a higher position in society than
the Hutus, despite comprising the minority.62 Belgian colonizers
favored the Tutsi minority, thereby reinforcing the divisive social
system and exacerbating the pre-existing tensions between the two
groups.63 In 1959, the Hutus launched a revolution, bolstered by the
desire for equality.64 For the next two years, Tutsis were killed in
large numbers and over 100,000 were forced to flee to neighboring
56. Owen Bowcott, Yugoslavia Tribunal Closes, Leaving a Powerful Legacy of War
Crimes Justice, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017
/dec/20/former-yugoslavia-war-crimes-tribunal-leaves-powerful-legacy-milosevic-karadzic
-mladic [https://perma.cc/CD2R-HY9Q]; ICTY, INT’L JUST. RES. CTR., https://ijrcenter.org
/international-criminal-law/ICTY [https://perma.cc/D9CP-PFZS].
57. Infographic: ICTY Facts and Figures, supra note 22.
58. Id.
59. Press Release, ICTY Marks Official Closure with Moving Ceremony in The Hague,
LEGACY WEBSITE OF THE INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Dec. 27, 2017),
https://www.icty.org/en/press/icty-marks-official-closure-with-moving-ceremony-in-the
-hague [http://perma.cc/NZ25-GL5Z].
60. T.J., What the Yugoslav war-crimes tribunal achieved, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 7,
2017), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/12/07/what-the-yugoslav
-war-crimes-tribunal-achieved [http://perma.cc/ZUS5-26H8].
61. Rwanda: How the genocide happened, BBC NEWS (May 17, 2011), https://www.bbc
.com/news/world-africa-13431486 [https://perma.cc/EQ7V-CU7D].
62. Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, OUTREACH PROGRAMME ON THE 1994
GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TUTSI IN RWANDA AND THE U.N., https://www.un.org/en/prevent
genocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
63. Rwandan Genocide, HISTORY (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics
/africa/rwandan-genocide [http://perma.cc/Nx7N-U5TY].
64. Rwanda Genocide of 1994: Background, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994 [http://perma.cc/M2PD-PDAR].
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countries.65 The revolution marked the end of the Tutsis’ social domination.66 By 1962, Rwanda had declared independence from Belgium,
and the Hutus had taken over the government.67 Ethnic tensions
were stronger than ever.68
In the two decades that followed, Tutsi refugees living in neighboring countries organized and carried out a series of attacks on Hutu
targets, resulting in large-scale retaliatory killings of Tutsi civilians
still living in Rwanda.69 By the 1980s, this violence had increased the
number of Rwandan refugees to nearly 500,000.70 In 1988, a group
of such refugees living in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF).71 The RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990 with the goal of overthrowing then-President Juvenal Habyarimana.72 In 1993, after years
of fighting and civil unrest, a ceasefire and a series of negotiations
between the RPF and President Habyarimana led to the signing of the
Arusha Accords.73 The agreement laid the groundwork for a transitional government that would include the RPF and Hutu moderates.74 However, the agreement did little to settle the conflict, and, on
April 6, 1994, an airplane carrying President Habyarimana and
Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira, both of whom were Hutus,
was shot out of the sky.75 The resulting crash killed everyone on board
and served as a catalyst for the horrific violence that followed.76
For the next 100 days, Hutu extremists launched a widespread
and organized campaign of violence, killing Tutsis and moderate
Hutus around the country.77 Machetes were their preferred instrument.78 Local administrators who resisted the killings were either
removed from office or murdered.79 Government-sponsored radio
65. Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, supra note 62.
66. Rwanda: How the genocide happened, supra note 61.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, supra note 62.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Rwandan Genocide, supra note 63.
74. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and
the Rwandese Patriotic Front, RFP-Rwanda, Aug. 04, 1993, Annex I, art. 6–9, available
at https://peacemaker.un.org/rwanda-peaceagreementrpf93.
75. The identity of the perpetrator(s) of the crash has never been confirmed, but it
is assumed by some that the plane was shot down by Tutsi rebels. AFP, Who shot down
the presidents’ plane?: An unresolved Mystery, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2004), https://
www.economist.com/special-report/2004/03/25/who-shot-down-the-presidents-plane
[https://perma.cc/X58F-BYB2].
76. Id.
77. Rwanda Genocide of 1994: Genocide, supra note 64.
78. Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter, BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www
.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506 [https://perma.cc/7U2B-ENQA].
79. Rwandan Genocide, supra note 63.
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stations broadcasted hit lists and urged people to “weed out the cockroaches,” a code for killing Tutsis.80 The international community’s
failure to intervene, combined with the absence of the Rwandan
political parties’ commitment to reconciliation enabled the bloodshed
to continue.81 The genocide ended in July 1994, when the RPF defeated the Hutu government.82 In those three short months, more than
800,000 people were killed and an estimated 150,000 to 250,000
were subjected to wartime rape.83 By August 1994, an estimated two
million Rwandan refugees had fled to neighboring countries.84
1. The ICTR
On November 8, 1994, just over a year after the creation of the
ICTY, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 955, thereby establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).85
The “sole purpose” of the ICTR was prosecuting those responsible
for committing “genocide and other systematic, widespread, and
flagrant violations of international humanitarian law” in Rwanda,86
as well as prosecuting Rwandan citizens responsible for committing
such violations in neighboring countries.87
The ICTR was the first international tribunal in history to deliver
verdicts against people for the crime of genocide.88 It was also the
first institution to recognize rape as a form of genocide, ruling in its
judgement against Jean-Paul Akayesu that “rape and sexual violence . . . constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as
long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such.”89 The tribunal
80. Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter, supra note 78.
81. Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, supra note 62.
82. Burchfield, supra note 42.
83. Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, supra note 62.
84. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Rwandan Genocide and
Its Aftermath, in THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 2000: FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 245, 246 (Jan. 1, 2000), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/sowr/4a
4c754a9/state-worlds-refugees-2000-fifty-years-humanitarian-action.html [http://perma
.cc/UW58-4JHW].
85. Michael P. Scharf, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. OF INT’L L., http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ictr/ictr.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2020).
86. S.C. Res. 955, 1–2 (Nov. 8, 1994).
87. Home to thousands of Rwandan refugees, countries like Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced a spillover of violence throughout the Rwandan
genocide and in the months that followed. ALEXIS ARIEFF, RWANDA: IN BRIEF, CONG.
RSCH. SERV. R44402, at 7 (2019).
88. The ICTR in Brief, supra note 22.
89. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998);
The ICTR in Brief, supra note 22; Rwanda Genocide of 1994: Aftermath, supra note 64.
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indicted ninety-three individuals, including Prime Minister Jean
Kambanda and other high-ranking military and government officials, for genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.90 Of those ninety-three, sixty-two
were convicted, fourteen were acquitted, and ten were referred to
national jurisdictions.91
C. The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
The ICTY and ICTR [hereinafter referred to as the preceding
tribunals] were formed as internationally backed responses to the
atrocities committed against the people of Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia; however, their mandates were explicit in prescribing their
temporary nature.92 Established by the United Nations Security
Council in 2010, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals (the Mechanism) was created to continue to carry out the
“obligations and essential functions of the ICTY and the ICTR,”
following the close of the respective tribunals.93 The Mechanism has
two branches: one in The Hague, Netherlands that focuses on ICTY
cases and related matters, and another in Arusha, Tanzania that
focuses on ICTR cases.94
The functions of the tribunal include providing assistance to
domestic courts, managing judicial and historical archives, protecting victims and witnesses, and supervising the enforcement of sentences.95 Its primary purpose, however, is the execution of judicial
proceedings that stem from cases or investigations started at the
preceding tribunals.96 Since opening, the Mechanism has overseen
eighty-nine cases, three of which are still pending.97 The court has
completed a number of high-profile cases, including the appeal of
Radovan Karadžiþ, whose convictions for persecution, deportation,
90. Burchfield, supra note 42; Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, supra note 62;
The ICTR in Brief, supra note 22.
91. The ICTR in Brief, supra note 22.
92. Mandate and Structure, ICTR BASIC DOCUMENTS AND CASE L., http://ictrcaselaw
.org/ContentPage.aspx?cid=2 [http://perma.cc/7D3J-AURT]; Mandate and Crimes under
ICTY Jurisdictions, INT’L RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIBS., http://icty.org/sid/320
[http://perma.cc/85AU-2VYD].
93. S.C. Res. 1966, ¶ 4 (Dec. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Mechanism Statute].
94. Giorgia Tortora, The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals: A Unique
Model and Some of Its Distinctive Challenges, 21 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/5/mechanism-international-criminal-tri
bunals [http://perma.cc/5V6K-X2PP].
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Cases, THE INT’L RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIBS., https://www.irmct.org
/en/cases [http://perma.cc/X9NL-88QV].
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and genocide, among other things, were affirmed by the Appeals
Chamber.98 As of September 2020, approximately forty-five Convicted
Persons are still serving sentences throughout the western regions
of Europe and Africa, all of whom the Mechanism is responsible for
supervising.99 Each one will, at some point in the coming years, qualify
to apply for early release.100 It is the procedures of the Mechanism
that this Note seeks to amend.
II. CURRENT EARLY RELEASE PROCEDURES AT THE MECHANISM
A. Statutory Procedure
The Preceding Tribunals first began commuting sentences in
2001 (ICTY) and 2011 (ICTR), with the release of Zlatko Aleksovski
and Michel Bagaragaza.101 The Mechanism has continued the practice.102 Those released early by the ICTY and ICTR were freed on the
basis of Article 28 and Article 27 of their respective statutes—both
of which contain language identical to that in Article 26 of the Mechanism’s statute:
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the person
convicted by the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence,
the State concerned shall notify the Mechanism accordingly.
There shall only be pardon or commutation of sentence if the
President of the Mechanism so decides . . . .103

Sentences are commuted (i.e., shortened) at the discretion of the
Mechanism’s President.104 The Mechanism’s Practice Direction on
Pardon, Commutation, and Early Release does require consultation
98. Prosecutor v. Karadžiþ, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, Judgement, at 318 (Int’l Residual
Mechanism for Crim. Tribs. Mar. 20, 2019).
99. Enforcement of Sentences, THE INT’L RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIBS.,
https://www.irmct.org/en/about/functions/enforcement-of-sentences [http://perma.cc
/JL6E-VN4F].
100. Id.
101. Choi, supra note 34, at 1790 (citing Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1,
Order of the President for the Early Release of Zlatko Aleksovski (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 14, 2011)); Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86
-S, Decision on the Early Release of Michel Bagaragaza (Oct. 24, 2011).
102. See Question & Answers, THE INT’L RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIBS.,
https://www.irmct.org/en/about/questions-answers [http://perma.cc/8CJX-JHCW].
103. Mechanism Statute, art. 26; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (amended Jan. 31, 2010) [hereinafter ICTR statute], art. 27; Updated Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (amended July 7, 2009)
[hereinafter ICTY statute], art. 28.
104. Mechanism Statute, art. 26.
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with any of the Judges involved in sentencing the individual whose
application is up for review; however, the President has the final say,
and their decision is not subject to appeal.105 Rule 151 of the Mechanism’s Rules and Procedures lists four factors that should be taken
into account, inter alia, while determining whether early release is
appropriate: (1) the gravity of the crime or crimes for which the
prisoner was convicted, (2) the treatment of similarly situated prisoners, (3) the prisoner’s demonstration of rehabilitation, and (4) any
substantial cooperation of the prisoner with the Prosecutor.106 Application of the early release Articles and the rules related to them has
evolved into what is now referred to as the two-thirds rule.107
B. The Two-Thirds Rule: Presumption-Turned-Quasi-Rule
The two-thirds “rule” is a presumption favoring early release for
persons convicted by the ICTY who have served two-thirds of their
sentence and persons convicted by the ICTR who have served threequarters of their sentence.108 Reaching the two-thirds threshold of
a sentence does not guarantee early release.109 However, it was viewed
by the preceding tribunals as a “benchmark” or “mark of eligibility”
to be considered when reviewing applications.110 The presumption
relies, in part, upon the desire to make tribunal jurisprudence and
procedure consistent with the legislation of the states in which
Convicted Persons carry out their sentences [hereinafter states of
imprisonment].111 Many states of imprisonment have legislation
that ascribes eligibility for early release to domestic persons who
have served a benchmark duration of their sentences.112 Given that
105. Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Determination of Applications for
Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and Early Release of Persons Convicted by the ICTR,
the ICTY or the Mechanism (Doc. No. MICT/3), ¶¶ 7, 12 (July 5, 2012) [hereinafter
Mechanism Practice Direction]; see Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-IC-AR,
Decision on Appeal of a Decision of the President on Early Release, ¶ 3 (Aug. 24, 2006)
(stating “[t]he Appeals Chamber cannot identify any legal basis for its consideration of
this appeal. . . . The Tribunal’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not
provide for appellate review of such a decision.”).
106. International Residual Mechanism Rules of Procedure and Evidence, MICT/1/Rev
.5, R. 151 (Mar. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Mechanism Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
107. See Merrylees, supra note 34, at 71.
108. See id.; Hola, supra note 25.
109. See Merrylees, supra note 34, at 71.
110. Prosecutor v. ýoriþ, Case No. MICT-17-112-ES.4, Further Redacted Public
Redacted Version of the Decision of the President on the Early Release of Valentin ýoriþ
and Related Motions, ¶ 38 (Jan. 16, 2019) [hereinafter ýoriþ Early Release Decision];
Simba Early Release Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 32.
111. ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, UNICRI ¶ 52 (2009), https://www.icty.org/x
/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/ICTY_Manual_on_Developed_Practices.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SVZ6-GA7M].
112. Id. ¶¶ 53–55.
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these countries had accepted responsibility for enforcing sentences,
the preceding tribunals operated on the notion that judicial consistency was promoted by implementing procedures that mirrored
state legislation.113
After serving as the President of the ICTY for a total of six years,
Judge Theodor Meron carried the two-thirds rule over to the Mechanism during his tenure as the residual court’s first President.114 The
Mechanism, which now supervises all remaining ICTR and ICTY
sentences, as well as its own, has favored the ICTY’s two-thirds
threshold.115 Though the threshold is not codified in any of the tribunals’ statutes, it has been applied with such frequency that at least
once, a Trial Chamber factored the likelihood of early release into
the sentence of a convicted individual.116
C. Criticism of the Two-Thirds Rule
Victims of and witnesses to crimes charged at the ICTY, ICTR,
and the Mechanism have been critical of the practice of releasing
Convicted Persons early.117 Survivor support organizations like the
Genocide Survivors Foundation (GSF) have pleaded with the Mechanism to halt early release procedures for convicted genocidaires
altogether.118 In a letter to President Meron, GSF argued that early
release was a “privilege . . . reserved for common criminals, not for
those convicted of genocide, the ‘crime of all crimes’.”119
The Mechanism has also been criticized for a lack of transparency
in its early release proceedings.120 President Meron’s formal request to
Rwanda for its opinion on Aloys Simba’s application for early release
113. Id. ¶ 57.
114. ýoriþ Early Release Decision, supra note 110, ¶¶ 38–39; Former Presidents, LEGACY
WEBSITE OF THE ICTY, https://www.icty.org/en/about/chambers/former-presidents [http://
perma.cc/D7M9-6FEB].
115. ýoriþ Early Release Decision, supra note 110, ¶ 38.
116. Prosecutor v. Nikoliþ, Case No. IT-94-2-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 97
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2005).
117. See, e.g., Trahan, supra note 15.
118. Jacqueline Murekatete, Letter to Honorable Judge Theodor Meron Re: Application
for early release from Aloys Simba (MICT-14-62), Dominique Ntawukulilyayo (MICT-1334) and Hasan Ngeze (MICT-13-37), GENOCIDE SURVIVORS FOUNDATION at 7 (July 4, 2018),
https://genocidesurvivorsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Genocide-Survivors
-Foundation27s-Letter-to-Judge-Meron-of-MICT.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3PW-MH65].
119. Id.; see also William A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute
Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 39, 43 (2003).
120. Edmund Kagire, Why Rwanda is furious with the UN Court leniency, THE EAST
AFRICAN (June 11, 2018), https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Rwanda-furious-UN
-Court-leniency-genocide/4552908-4605838-10a3uo5z/index.html [https://perma.cc/56WT
-3RYU].
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was the first communication of its kind during the first six years of
the Mechanism.121 Up until that point, all early release decisions on
ICTR Convicted Persons had been made without notification of the
Rwandan government.122 In 2018, Rwanda’s UN envoy Valentine
Rugwabiza filed an official complaint with the Security Council.123 She
cited the timing of the request as an example of how leaving the decision process up to the personal discretion of the President had created
a “credibility crisis.”124 The inability to consistently participate—or,
at least, be aware of—the proceedings has made Rwandans feel that
the Mechanism is being purposefully opaque.125
The fact that victims and witnesses do not have to be notified
when relevant Convicted Persons are up for early release has also
been of particular concern.126 For example, Ferdinand Nahimana,
sentenced in 2007 to thirty-years’ imprisonment for direct and public
incitement to commit genocide via his radio show, was granted early
release in 2016.127 The Rwandan government and the witnesses for
his case learned of his release, ironically, on the radio.128 When Aloys
Simba was similarly released without formal notification of the Rwandan public, government officials decried the fact that the process
had been carried out “in secret.”129
Whether they advocate for the complete abolition of the practice
or a modification of how it is conducted, the people that critique
early release and the two-thirds rule are the same people who stand
to be most affected by it.130 These critiques evidence the need to
create a process that is more transparent and victim-inclusive.
121. Simba Early Release Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 66; Peter Mugabo, Rwanda Seeks
Russian Help to Stop UN Freeing Key Genocide Convicts, RWANDA NEWS (June 7, 2018),
http://www.newsofrwanda.com/featured1/32744/rwanda-seeks-russian-help-to-stop-un
-freeing-key-genocide-convicts [https://perma.cc/6U3L-FXY7].
122. Mugabo, supra note 121.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Kagire, supra note 120.
126. See id.
127. During the Genocide, Nahimana had co-founded an incendiary radio station that
published the names and locations of surviving Tutsis, inciting violence against those
populations. Moore, supra note 16. Because the Trial Chamber credited Nahimana’s time
spent in jail from his arrest in 1996 to the Appeal Chamber’s affirmation of his conviction in 2007, the radio host was able to reach the two-thirds threshold of his thirtyyear sentence in 2016. See Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICR-99-52-A, [Appeal]
Judgement, ¶ 1115 (Nov. 28, 2007).
128. Moore, supra note 16.
129. Statement from Rwanda Minister of Justice on the Early Release of Aloys Simba
by Judge Theodor Meron, TOP AFRICA NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019), http://www.topafricanews
.com/2019/01/17/statement-from-rwanda-minister-of-justice-on-the-early-release-of-aloys
-simba-by-judge-theodor-meron [https://perma.cc/C9C6-SD6E].
130. See Kagire, supra note 120; Moore, supra note 16.
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III. VICTIM IMPACT AT THE MECHANISM
The Practice Direction on Pardon, Commutation and Early Release [Mechanism Practice Direction] at the Mechanism is a five-page
document that governs how the tribunal handles early release.131
The Mechanism Practice Direction explains, in very limited terms,
the procedure associated with submitting, reviewing, and deciding
on an application for early release.132 When a Convicted Person’s
sentence is approaching the two-thirds mark, the state of imprisonment must inform the Mechanism.133 Upon notification of eligibility,
the Office of the Registry must take a series of steps to prepare for
the application review process.134 One of these steps, provided for in
subparagraph 4(d), is the optional collection of any information not
otherwise required by the Practice Direction that the President
deems relevant.135 Oftentimes, though, the President does not seek
any additional documents at all.136
Submission pursuant to subparagraph 4(d) is the only means by
which victim impact can be folded into the President’s review of
early release applications.137 The Prosecution has attempted to admit
victim letters as part of its submissions; however, the choice to review
the letters is the President’s alone.138 In the ten years that the Mechanism has been open, the Presidential stance on the admission of victim
statements has shifted from one extreme to the other, based on the
discretion of the judge holding the position.139
In his decision on Aloys Simba’s appeal, former President Theodor
Meron stated that he could not find a “sufficiently compelling reason”
131. See Practice Direction on Pardon, Commutation and Early Release, International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (amended Feb. 20, 2019) [hereinafter
Practice Direction on Pardon].
132. See id. ¶¶ 2–7, 10–15.
133. Id. ¶ 2.
134. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
135. Id. ¶ 4(d).
136. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruzindana, Case No. MICT-12-10-ES, Decision of the
President on the Early Release of Obed Ruzindana ¶¶ 1, 22, 26 (Mar. 13, 2014);
Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. MICT-13-35-ES, Public Redacted Version of the 19 July
2016 Decision of the President on the Early Release of Emmanuel Rukundo ¶¶ 1, 18, 21,
34 (Dec. 5, 2016); Prosecutor v. Lukiþ, Case No. MICT-14-67-ES.4, Decision of the
President on the Early Release of Sreten Lukiþ ¶¶ 2, 14, 19, 37–38 (Sept. 17, 2018) (none
of which include information related to anything outside of that which Rule 151 requires
the President to consider in their decision).
137. See Practice Direction on Pardon, supra note 131, ¶ 4(d).
138. See ýoriþ Early Release Decision, supra note 110, ¶¶ 23–25; see also Mechanism
Practice Direction, supra note 105, ¶¶ 8–11.
139. Compare Simba Early Release Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 72, with Prosecutor v.
Bralo, Case No. MICT-14-78-ES, Decision on the Early Release of Miroslav Bralo, ¶ 74
(Dec. 31, 2019) [hereinafter Decision on the Early Release of Miroslav Bralo].
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to consider submissions by victims and halted his analysis on the
matter there.140 In contrast, the December 2019 decision on the early
release of Miroslav Bralo delivered by Judge Carmel Agius, the current President of the Mechanism, featured frequent references to
the victims and witnesses relevant to the case at hand.141 Though
President Agius did not expressly mention victim impact as one of
the deciding factors in his conclusory remarks, he did include, in an
unprecedented move, an “Impact on Victims and Witnesses” section
that summarily recognized that Bralo’s release would affect victims
of his crimes and that such would be considered in the final decision.142 He specifically acknowledged the Prosecution’s submission
regarding the “horrific and depraved nature of Bralo’s violent crimes”
and the potential risk of retraumatizing surviving victims.143 President Agius ultimately denied Bralo’s application.144
There is a stark difference between Presidents Agius’s and
Meron’s perspective on the degree of importance that victim impact
can hold in early release decisions. Whereas President Agius favors
inclusion of victim submissions now, who is to say whether this
proclivity will continue throughout his tenure?145 Whether the next
President will share the same concern for victims? If the Mechanism
does not modify its early release process to include a mandated seat
for victim submissions, the role of victims in the process will be
subject entirely to the determination of the President. This Note
provides recommendations for how to implement a permanently
victim-inclusive process.
IV. MODIFYING EARLY RELEASE PROCEDURES AT THE MECHANISM
A. Why Victims Need to Be Included in the Process
Releasing international criminals convicted of heinous crimes
early, without incorporating the concerns of their victims and witnesses, contravenes the very purpose of international criminal tribunals.
Consider the scope of some of the crimes that make up the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Mechanism and the Tribunals that preceded it:
140. Simba Early Release Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 72.
141. Decision on the Early Release of Miroslav Bralo, supra note 139, at 28, 32, 74, 80;
see also Judge Carmel Agius, President, THE IRMCT, https://www.irmct.org/en/about
/judges/judge-carmel-agius-president [https://perma.cc/EC3C-ES65].
142. Decision on the Early Release of Miroslav Bralo, supra note 139, ¶ 80.
143. Id. ¶ 74.
144. Id. ¶ 81.
145. Id. ¶ 80.
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Genocide: killing members of a group, causing serious
bodily harm to members of the group, or, among other
things, imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group—all done with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a specified racial, ethnical, religious
or national group;146
Crime Against Humanity: committing the crime of
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or persecution on political,
racial and religious grounds, as part of a “widespread
or systematic attack against any civilian population”
on the basis of a specified identity.147

The murder, rape, or torture of a single person does not create a factual basis for genocide or crimes against humanity.148 These crimes
arise only out of the widespread victimization of a population.149
Without victims, there are no crimes. And without witnesses,
many of whom were direct victims of the crimes that they testify
about, developing cases against indicted individuals would be more
arduous a task than it already is. The ICTY alone heard testimonies
from more than 4,650 Prosecution and Defense witnesses over the
course of its tenure.150 The judgments of Convicted Persons are often
hundreds, if not thousands, of pages long, due in great part to the
plethora of evidence brought before the court.151 It does not make
sense to turn to a community of people for the sake of building a case
against their former oppressor, only to turn away from them when
it comes time to decide whether that person should be freed prior to
the end of their sentence and allowed to reenter society.
One of the primary principles of international criminal law is
the goal of fighting against impunity.152 “‘Impunity’” is “the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of ” holding human rights violators accountable for their crimes, because “they are not subject to any inquiry that
might” result in arrest, trial, or conviction.153 The goal of fighting
146. ICTR Statute, art. 2(2); ICTY Statute, art. 4(2).
147. ICTR Statute, art. 3; ICTY Statute, art. 5.
148. ICTR Statute, art. 3.
149. ICTR Statute, arts. 2(2), 3; ICTY Statute, art. 4(2).
150. Infographic: ICTY Facts and Figures, supra note 22.
151. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mladic, Case No. IT-09-92-T, Judgment (Nov. 22, 2017)
(taking up five volumes, the judgment is more than 2,500 pages long).
152. Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can Put
Tyrants on Trial, 38 COR. INT’L L.J. 649, 661 (2005).
153. Louis Joinet, Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations
(Civil and Political): Final report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission
decision 1996/119, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, 15–16 (1997).
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impunity is weakened by the notion that Convicted Persons can be
released early without any consideration of the potential harm on
the victims and witnesses of their crimes. For these reasons, it is
important and necessary to incorporate the concerns of victims and
witnesses into the review and decision process for applications for
early release at the Mechanism.
As previously stated, the only way that victim impact can be considered in early release decisions is if the President, via subsection
4(d) of the Mechanism Practice Direction, chooses to do so.154 The interpretations of that provision by the two judges that have served as
President of the Mechanism thus far differ greatly.155 Rectifying this
inconsistency requires a change at the Mechanism. This Note proposes
a two-step process: (1) amendment of Mechanism Rule 151 and (2)
modification of the existing Practice Direction on Early Release.
B. Step 1: Amend Rule 151 of the Mechanism’s Rules of Evidence
and Procedure
The most straightforward means of incorporating victim impact
into the early release review process is the amendment of an existing rule. Amendment of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is not
an uncommon practice at the Mechanism.156 Rule 6 permits and
provides the details of the amendment process.157 Suggested rule
changes can come from a Judge, the Prosecutor, or the Registrar.158
Proposed rules are adopted if they are agreed to by thirteen judges
or by a majority of the judges present at a plenary meeting organized by the President.159 Since the Rules were first published in
July 2012, they have been amended six times, including twice in the
last eleven months.160 This Note proposes another amendment.
Rule 151 lists the four factors to be considered for granting early
release.161 The rule should be amended as marked by italics below:
In determining whether pardon, commutation of sentence, or early
release is appropriate, the President shall take into account,
154. See Practice Direction on Pardon, supra note 131, ¶ 4(d).
155. Compare Simba Early Release Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 72, with Decision on the
Early Release of Miroslav Bralo, supra note 139, ¶ 74.
156. Mechanism Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 6.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. U.N. IRMCT, Rules of Procedure of Evidence, UN Doc. MICT/1/Amend.6 (Dec. 18,
2019), https://www.irmct.org/en/basic-documents/rules-procedure-and-evidence [https://
perma.cc/BZ2S-KHBL].
161. Mechanism Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 151.
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inter alia, the gravity of the crime or crimes for which the prisoner was convicted, the treatment of similarly-situated prisoners, the prisoner’s demonstration of rehabilitation, the concerns
of Prosecution witnesses and victims, as well as any substantial
cooperation of the prisoner with the Prosecutor.

The use of the word “concerns” is a conscious choice because
ascertaining the concerns of a group requires interaction with said
group, whereas “interests” can be inferred from existing information
or external third parties. Requiring an assessment of victim concern
ensures that victims are engaged in the process. Past amendments
to the procedural rules of the Mechanism have featured the complete rewording of sections of a rule.162 Technically speaking, making consideration of victim impact a procedural requirement for
early release proceedings requires little more than the addition of
seven words to an existing rule.
Of course, per Mechanism Rule 6, amendments only enter into
force after they have been agreed to by a collection of judges.163 How
the various judges that presently serve the Mechanism would receive this rule change is a matter for another paper. However, the
current President, Judge Agius, has historically favored the inclusion of victim statements in early release proceedings.164 With him
at the helm of the Tribunal and in consideration of the fact that the
proposed amendment would not require the application of extensive
changes to existing proceedings, one is optimistic about how the
amendment might be received if proposed by one of the parties that
has the power to do so.165
C. Step 2: Modify the Mechanism’s Existing Practice Direction on
Early Release
The Mechanism’s Practice Direction on Early Release is meant
to expand upon the requirements of the rules, in order to clarify how
to apply them.166 To ensure that the amendment to Rule 151 is carried
out as intended, the section of the Practice Direction that covers the
duties of the Registry needs to be modified. At present, the Practice
Direction lists four responsibilities of the Registry following notification of a Convicted Person’s eligibility for early release.167 This Note
162. See, e.g., U.N. IRMCT, Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
MICT/1/Amend.2 21 (Oct. 3, 2016).
163. Mechanism Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 6.
164. See, e.g., Decision on the Early Release of Miroslav Bralo, supra note 139, ¶ 80.
165. Mechanism Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 6.
166. See Mechanism Practice Direction, supra note 105, ¶ 1.
167. Practice Direction on Pardon, supra note 131, ¶ 4.
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proposes the addition of a fifth, marked as subsection (d), modifying
the practice direction as follows:
4. After receiving the notification of eligibility, the Registry shall:
(a) Inform the convicted person that he or she may be eligible for pardon, commutation of sentence or early release
and advise him or her of the steps that will be taken;
(b) Request reports and observations from the relevant authorities in the enforcing State as to the behavior of the
convicted person during his or her period of incarceration and
the general conditions under which he or she was imprisoned, and request from such authorities any psychiatric or
psychological evaluations prepared on the mental condition
of the convicted person during the period of incarceration;
(c) Request the Prosecutor to submit a detailed report of any
co-operation that the convicted person has provided to the
Office of the Prosecutor and the significance thereof; and
(d) Request the Prosecution to acquire, in conjunction with
the Witness Support and Protection Unit where necessary,
detailed information on the following from the government
of the Requested Area of Release:
(i) effects upon the health and safety of victims, Prosecution witnesses, and their families if the Convicted
Person is released;
(ii) evidence of any threats, direct or indirect, made
against the aforementioned parties by the Convicted
Person and/or their known associates; and
(e) Obtain any other information that the President considers relevant.

Requesting information on matters of health and safety, rather
than asking for an assessment of the general attitudes and feelings
of victims is intentional. Focusing on the former helps combat the
potential counterargument that including victims in the early release process will only encourage submissions from people who seek
to use the Mechanism to carry out personal vendettas. Some might
worry that the modification would enable victor’s justice168 to seep
168. “Victor’s justice” refers to situations in which the party or group in power following a conflict and a regime change utilizes its position to retributively punish members
of the losing party or group. See Gary J. Bass, Why Not Victor’s Justice?, WASH. POST
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into the work of the Tribunal; however, this suggested modification
does not advocate for unwielded collection of opinion statements about
how disliked the Convicted Person is or was. This change would
require the collection of concrete information on potential dangers
posed by intended actions of the Mechanism—information that the
Mechanism’s Witness Support and Protection Unit is already in the
position to collect.169
Including the collection of victim statements as one of the listed
steps for early release application preparation ensures that whether
the President considers it relevant or not, victim impact will always
be an automatic and essential aspect of early release proceedings.
Part of the critiques of early release discussed in Part II stem from
the fact that communities in locales affected by conflict are afraid of
sharing the streets with the very people who destroyed their neighbor’s home, raped their cousin, murdered their grandfather—or
ordered others to carry out such crimes.170 Acknowledging legitimate
concerns about the threat to safety and personal well-being posed by
the release of a convicted war criminal is essential to determining
whether that individual should be released or required to serve their
sentence in full.
V. VICTIM IMPACT AT SIMILARLY STRUCTURED BODIES: THE
(RESIDUAL) SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
The inclusion of victim impact in sentence commutation proceedings is not unheard of in the realm of international law. The
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and its successor court, the
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL), have developed
a procedural structure for reviewing early release applications that
centers the concerns of victims.171
A. The Sierra Leonean Civil War and President Kabbah’s Special
Court
From 1991 to 2002, Sierra Leoneans suffered the violent consequences of a civil war launched by the Revolutionary United Front
(Feb. 15, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/02/15/why-not
-victors-justice/b9f4aa5e-ee70-47e9-9942-262d8dc33dcd [https://perma.cc/NHT3-8UNN].
169. Mechanism Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 32.
170. See Murekatete, supra note 118.
171. See Practice Direction on the Conditional Early Release of Persons Convicted by
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 5(D)(ii)(d)–(e), 5(E)–(F)(iii) (Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter RSCSL Practice Direction], http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/PRACTICE_DIREC
TION_Conditional_Early_Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8Y5-C7BH].

2020]

AMPLIFYING VOICES AND FIGHTING IMPUNITY

255

(RUF) and its leader, former army corporal Foday Sankoh.172 Though
the exact number of casualties is unknown, death toll estimates range
from 30,000 to 70,000 people.173 Thousands more were victims of
abduction, sexual slavery, indiscriminate amputation, and more than
half of the population was forcefully displaced.174 On August 9, 2000,
Sierra Leone’s President Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah sent a letter
to the Security Council requesting assistance from the international
community in the form of a “special court for Sierra Leone.”175 The
Security Council acknowledged the request and adopted Resolution
1315, requesting that the Secretary General negotiate an agreement
with the Sierra Leonean government to create the court.176
Two years later, the Special Court for Sierra Leone opened.177
The SCSL indicted fourteen individuals and ultimately convicted
nine178 of them, including Charles Taylor, the former President of
Liberia.179 In 2013, the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone
(RSCSL) took over the SCSL’s remaining responsibilities, including
witness protection, supervising the imprisonment of still-incarcerated
Convicted Persons, and historical preservation.180
172. Sierra Leone Civil War, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, https://www.globalsecurity.org
/military/world/war/sierra_leone.htm [https://perma.cc/VP3L-ZGTJ].
173. Mary Kaldor & James Vincent, Human Security: Evaluation of UNDP Assistance
to Conflict-Affected Countries, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 1, 6 (2006), http://web.undp.org
/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/SierraLeone.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX5P-2JUN];
Sierra Leone, MASS ATROCITY ENDINGS (Aug. 7, 2015), https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityend
ings/2015/08/07/sierra-leone/#Fatalities [https://perma.cc/35SW-XZVA].
174. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32
MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 395, 398–99 (2011); Kaldor & Vincent, supra note 173. For a more
in-depth description of the atrocities committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war, see
Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, and Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 1999), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/sierra.
175. Annex to the Letter dated Aug. 9, 2000 from the Permanent Representative of
Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,
at 2, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000).
176. S.C. Res. 1315, 1 (Aug. 14, 2000).
177. Jalloh, supra note 174, at 404.
178. President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Eleventh and Final Report of the
President (Dec. 2013), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/AnRpt11.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9CPA-C93T].
179. Lansana Gberie, The Special Court for Sierra Leone rests—for good, AFR. RENEWAL (Apr. 2014), https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2014/special-court
-sierra-leone-rests-%E2%80%93-good [https://perma.cc/GA4K-HY56]. Prior to becoming
President, the Liberian warlord Charles Taylor and the RPF’s Foday Sankoh had formed
an agreement to support one another in overthrowing their respective governments. See
Ismail Rashid, Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front, THE J. OF COMPLEX OPERATIONS, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/780201/chapter-8-sierra-leone-the-revolution
ary-united-front [https://perma.cc/342Z-AAG3.
180. The Mandate of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, THE RESIDUAL
SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/RSCSL-Mandate.html [https://
perma.cc/2CYP-6XHN].
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B. Procedural Similarities Between the Mechanism and the
RSCSL
Early release was first provided for in Article 23 of the Statute
of the SCSL, using language identical to that of the Mechanism.181
Both Courts rested the power of commutation in the hands of their
respective Presidents.182 Both statutes state that sentences can only
be pardoned or commuted if the President so decides.183 The RSCSL
Statute contains similar language.184
C. Consideration of Victim Impact as a Statutory Requirement
Though the statutory provisions of the SCSL and the Mechanism are similar, the RSCSL’s procedural structure for early release
is substantially more robust than that of the Mechanism—particularly
concerning victim impact.185 Article 24 of the RSCSL’s Statute mirrors the language of articles in its predecessors’ statutes; however,
its rules expand the standard upon which the President must base
his or her decisions on early release applications.186 Rule 124, which
is still in force, states that:
There shall only be pardon, commutation of sentence or early
release if the President of the Residual Special Court . . . after
considering the position of the Prosecutor, which shall incorporate
the interests of Prosecution witnesses and victims, as well as the
convicted person individually or through counsel, so decides on the
basis of the interests of justice and the general principles of law.187

The RSCSL is the first (and only) of the five international tribunals discussed in this Note to make consideration of victim impact
a statutorily required component of early release proceedings.188 Expanding upon this requirement, the RSCSL’s thirty-four-page Practice
Direction on Conditional Early Release details the various ways in
which victims and Prosecution witnesses are to be involved in early
release proceedings.189
181. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter SCSL Statute], art. 23;
Mechanism Statute, art. 26.
182. SCSL Statute, art. 23; Mechanism Statute, art. 26.
183. SCSL Statute, art. 23; Mechanism Statute, art. 26.
184. RSCSL Statute, art. 24.
185. See RSCSL Practice Direction, supra note 171, art. 5(D)(ii)(d)–(e), 5(E)–(F)(iii).
186. Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 124.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Article 5 sections (D)(ii)(d)–(e), (E), (F)(i)–(iv), and (G) provide detailed instructions for the Registrar on collection of information related to witness and victim safety.
6(B) covers the responsibility of the Prosecution to submit a report summarizing that
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The Office of the Registrar oversees the administrative functions of the SCSL and plays an integral role in gathering and organizing the information used in early release proceedings.190 First,
the Registrar must inform victims and relevant witnesses of “any
impending Conditional Early Release of Convicted Persons.”191 The
office is then required to ask states of imprisonment for details on
evidence of Convicted Persons’ empathy towards and willingness to
make amends with victims, individually and collectively.192 The Registrar must also work with the Witness and Victims Section to collect
information including the “[e]ffects upon the well-being and safety”
of victims, witnesses and their families; evidence of threatening
behavior against those parties; and, any evidence that the Convicted
Person might, upon release, incite former associates to commit acts
of violence.193 The Registrar must then compile this information and
responses to other inquiries into a report that the Prosecutor can
then submit for transmission to the President.194
The President’s decision on an application for early release must
be accompanied by a “reasoned opinion” that includes, among other
things, an evaluation of “[t]he safety [. . .], views and concerns of victims, witnesses, and their families, if any” as described in the Prosecution’s submission.195 The last step in the execution of the decision,
prior to actually releasing the Convicted Person, is to again notify
victims and witnesses of the granted application.196
D. The Rules in Practice
In September 2016, Allieu Kondewa submitted an application
for Determination of Eligibility for Consideration of Conditional Early
Release to the RSCSL President.197 Convicted on four counts of war
information to the President. 8(D)(i)–(iii) specifically lists the safety, views, and concerns
of victims, witnesses, and their respective families as factors to be considered by the
President during their review of early release applications. 9(A) and 10(F) cover the
procedure for notification of witnesses and victims following the conclusion of an early
release application review. See RSCSL Practice Direction, supra note 171.
190. The Office of the Registrar, RESIDUAL SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www
.rscsl.org/registrar.html [https://perma.cc/8LRE-W2MT]; see RSCSL Practice Direction,
supra note 171, art. 3(B).
191. RSCSL Practice Direction, supra note 171, art. 5(E).
192. Id. art. 5(D)(ii)(d)–(e).
193. Id. art. 5(F).
194. Id. art. 5(G).
195. Id. art. 8(D)(i)–(ii).
196. RSCSL Practice Direction, supra note 171, art. 9(A); see also Residual Special
Court for Sierra Leone Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 34 (reinforcing the duty to
notify victims and witnesses).
197. Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. RSCSL-04-14-ES, Decision of the President on
Application for Conditional Early Release, ¶¶ 1, 3–4 (May 29, 2017) [hereinafter Kondewa
Early Release Decision].
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crimes, three counts of crimes against humanity, and one count of
a serious violation of international humanitarian law, Kondewa was
thirteen years into his twenty-year sentence at the time of his application.198 In February 2017, the Prosecutor filed submissions reflective of the Registrar’s Article 5 findings (referring to Article 5 of
the RSCSL Practice Direction),199 which included 5(G)-(E) submissions on the views and concerns of victims, witnesses, and their
families.200 In a section of her decision dedicated specifically to the
subject, then-President Renate Winter reviewed the submissions.201
The primary concern for the eighteen witnesses interviewed by
the Prosecution in preparation for their submission was their safety
in the event that Kondewa was released.202 Given that he had been
a revered leader and war hero prior to his arrest, witnesses feared
that former subordinates who remained loyal to him would be eager
to follow whatever directions he provided.203 One witness feared that
popularity amongst this group might enable political engagement.204
Others worried about how sincere Kondewa would be in abiding by
the conditions of his release.205 Winter asserted that the witnesses’
concerns were “legitimate and serious enough to militate against . . .
granting” the application and that she would consider them in her
final decision.206 She then went on to discuss the efficacy of the Sierra
Leone Police’s National Witness Protection Programme (the authority
responsible for monitoring released Convicted Persons) and reviewed
the reports from prison authorities on Kondewa’s behavior and
disposition while incarcerated.207
In her conclusion, President Winter noted that of all the factors
discussed in her decision, the factor that weighed most heavily against
granting the application was the security concern of victims and witnesses and a fear that he would use potential popularity to get
involved in politics.208 However, the President stated that she did not
believe that these concerns rose to an “insurmountable” degree.209
198. At sentencing, Kondewa’s sentence was back-dated by the court to the day of his arrest in 2003. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3–4; see also Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, at 34 (Oct. 9, 2007).
199. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
200. Kondewa Early Release Decision, supra note 197, ¶¶ 7, 32.
201. Id. ¶¶ 32–39.
202. Id. ¶ 32.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. ¶¶ 7, 32.
206. Kondewa Early Release Decision, supra note 197, ¶ 38.
207. Id. ¶¶ 39, 48.
208. Id. ¶ 57.
209. Id.
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Recalling that many witnesses had stated that they would favor
early release if it was accompanied by conditions of strict monitoring
of Kondewa and regular victim/witness visitation, and in light of the
other information before her, Winter ultimately chose to grant
Kondewa’s application.210 Several conditions reflective of the witnesses’ concerns were imposed on his release, including subjecting
Kondewa to a further ten months in custody, effectively preventing
him from taking place in the upcoming election.211
That Kondewa was released following this comprehensive application review further strengthens the case against the argument
that amplifying the voice of victims would enforce victor’s justice.
The inclusion is not strictly intended to keep Convicted Persons in
prison. It is about ensuring that the person deciding whether to
release them must first confront the reality of the effect that the
Convicted Person has had on people’s lives. Because Judge Winter
was made directly aware of this information in the case of Kondewa,
she was able to impose conditions that specifically contemplated
what victims had conveyed to her.212
Inclusion of victim impact in proceedings at a United Nations
judicial body is therefore not unprecedented. The practices of the
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone and its predecessor, the
SCSL, exemplify how victims and witnesses integral to the casebuilding process can also play a constructive role in early release
decisions. Rule 124 and the RSCSL’s Practice Direction on Conditional Early Release combine to create a comprehensive “early release
blueprint” on which implementation of the modifications suggested
in Part IV can be based.
CONCLUSION
The creation of the ICTY and ICTR were pioneering acts in a
time when the field of international criminal law was just beginning
to emerge.213 For the first time in nearly five decades, perpetrators
of large-scale war crimes were investigated and indicted for their
crimes.214 The work that the Mechanism and its predecessors started
is important, but it has not finished.
210. Id. ¶¶ 58–61.
211. Id. ¶¶ 33, 59.
212. See Kondewa Early Release Decision, supra note 197, ¶¶ 57–58.
213. See Selma Korjenic, Despite Its Limits, the ICTY Has Blazed a Trail for Victims’
Empowerment, TRIAL INT’L (Aug. 14, 2017), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/de
spite-its-limits-the-icty-has-blazed-a-trail-for-victims-empowerment [https://perma.cc
/9VK4-U5KA]; The ICTR in Brief, supra note 22.
214. See Korjenic, supra note 213.
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There are, presently, numerous ongoing violent conflicts taking
place around the world.215 Each day, diverse populations of people are
subjected to horrific acts of torture and violence.216 Since the opening of the ICTY in 1994, a small number of institutions seeking to
fight impunity and promote justice for some of these populations
have emerged.217 The ICTY and the ICTR have served as examples
to these institutions.218 Current tribunals not only pull legal arguments from their legacies of substantive international criminal and
human rights law, but also learn from the “‘structural’ legacy” of how
an “ad hoc, time-bound international criminal court” should be run.219
The Mechanism carries on these legacies each day as it continues to do the work that its predecessors began. However, it has the
power to create a legacy of its own. One that is victim-conscious. One
that thinks of victim impact not only while building a case, but also
while deciding whether to return war criminals to their former communities. Demonstrating the importance of victim impact by considering it in all early release determinations can and should be one of
the “many lessons” that future institutions stand to benefit from
when looking to the standard set by the Mechanism for guidance.220
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